Why Switzerland?
Imagine, if you will, a modern state of seven million inhabitants of such heterogeneous complexity that even the dominant linguistic group does not represent, on its own, a majority of the voting populace. Imagine a state that is divided, unequally, into four distinctive language groups -each corresponding to a unique ethnic and cultural lineage with deep geo-historical roots -and then divide that state further into two separate and historically antagonistic religious camps. The image you may have constructed for yourself is of a society so deeply plagued by innate cleavages as to be utterly ungovernable by even the most brutal of authoritarian regimes.
The result to befall such a state, you might rightly assume, must surely rest with the likes of a Yugoslavian, Rwandan, Iraqi, or Cypriot, outcome: irreconcilable differences will amount to great social animosities, disillusionment with the governing body, hardened irredentist aspirations, and perhaps, to occasional homicidal and genocidal attitudes. Surely, a state of such innate division could not function properly within its own borders, let alone internationally in the competitive capitalist system of the global economy. In fact, if you were later enlightened by an informed colleague that such a state did indeed exist, in a highly stable, secure, and functioning manner, you might, with sceptical assurance, ask to review your friend's academic sources. And yet such a national anomaly does indeed exit in the nation-state of Switzerland.
"Why Switzerland?" Indeed, in its short and abbreviated totality, Jonathan Steinberg's opening question represents perhaps the most quintessential starting point for an academic investigation into the many colourful paradoxes that underlie the history of Swiss nationalism. Switzerland -both as a prosperous European state and as a distinct case study analysis of nationalism and multinational states -does not immediately strike the reader as either a very interesting or seemingly important area for scholastic investigation. Simply stated, an evaluation 1 Jonathan Steinberg, Why Switzerland? (Cambridge University Press, 1976) , 1. of Swiss nationalism, unlike the many turbulent and emotional national representations that dot the political globe -the Kurds of the Persian Gulf, the Armenians of South-western Europe, the Tartars of the Crimea, the Chechnians of the Caucasus, the Palestinians of the Middle East, the Hutus of Central Africa, the Jews of Eastern Europe, to name but a few -is easily perceived as a rather dry, and even perhaps boring, academic enterprise. Switzerland as a nation-state, and its nationalistic sentiment by association, is stable in its construction, secure in its image, and confident in its fecundity. Even the recent re-emergence of ethnically and linguistically-based national sentiments (along with the political insecurities these sentiments have catalyzed) in seemingly stable Western states -Quebec nationalism in Canada, Catalonian and Basque nationalism in Spain, Walloon nationalism in Belgium, Irish nationalism in England -does not have its equivalent in the Swiss case. As such, Switzerland continues to exist as a stable national ideal; an island of calm and healthy multi-ethnicity in a sea of increasingly turbulent and oftentimes violent sub-state national aspirations.
Yet, like its multi-ethnic democratic cousins of Western Europe and North America, Switzerland itself remains a deeply and irrevocably cleavaged society. The Swiss paradox, then, of multi-ethnic national stability, represents an interesting anomaly for students of history, political science, and federalism. In Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example, Hans Kohn, the great scholar and theoretician of national formation, devotes an entire manuscript to the evaluation (and ultimate praise) of Swiss nationalism, citing that "though Switzerland is only a small country of very limited natural resources, its kind of nationalism makes it an object of great and general interest at a period when the age of nationalism seems to reach its threatening climax in so many part of the globe" ─ a note that continues to have as great a resonances today as it did when Kohn first penned it in 1956.
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In a world of explosive national and international discord, of recurring genocidal hatred, of chronic violence and ethno-cultural war, the Swiss example offers a light onto others, a veritable living political manuscript, outlining the historical methods that allow for the construction of highly stable and functioning multi-ethnic nation-states. Unlocking the Swiss case, then, provides us with the theoretical keys that will be necessary for avoiding "the coming anarchy" of the post-Cold War Era, and might, a most noble endeavour, help academic and policy decision-maker alike establish and promote stable multi-ethnic national cooperation in the 21 st Century.
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To begin, we need to explore, and perhaps answer, a few questions. How is it possible, for instance, that Switzerland has managed to escape the painful historical outcome so common to other multi-ethnic states? In that respect, what is unique about Swiss national identity that has allowed the various groups to accept, and indeed promote, the cultural and linguistic rights of the others, while retaining a common national identity? And perhaps most importantly, can the model upon which the Swiss national identity rests, be copied and emulated by other less-stable nation-states, or is it rather an historical anomaly of improbable repetition?
The purpose of this historical analysis, then, is twofold; first, to explore the historical development of Swiss nationalism and explain the circumstances that has allowed it to be embodied into a stable and secure state, and second, to evaluate whether the Swiss example of The argument is presented in three sections. Part one of the paper will offer a brief historical overview of Switzerland, introducing the Swiss people, their state, and the specific cultural and linguistic cleavages that mark their nation. Part two will then present three primary circumstances that have led to the development of a stable national foundation in Switzerland:
(1) the threat of an external 'alien other', (2) elite accommodation and consociation of the national project, and (3) an innate willingness and desire to behave and be governed as a unitary, yet multi-ethnic, nation. By way of concluding the argument, section three will suggest that while the Swiss case is necessarily an end-result of unique historical occurrences, these stabilizing variables are nevertheless common enough, geographically and politically, so as to be of use by others living in distinct historical eras and geographical proximities. The lessons are of great value, then, to modern nation-building projects in Iraq, Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Ireland/England, Spain and even, in Canada.
From Confederation to Federation: A Union of Halberds
The Representatives, in which canton representation was based on the proportionality of population.
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The 1848 Constitution, amended slightly in 1874, established the proper political mechanisms and institutional balances that were needed to solidify the nascent Swiss nation and remedy the linguistic and ethnic differences that it encompassed. From that point on, a strongly unified Swiss nation prospered within a unified political federal system.
The Modern Swiss: Unity in Diversity
What does Switzerland look like today? Our historical overview mentioned, in passing, the existence of various minority groups coexisting throughout Switzerland's history. Generally speaking, the composition and diversity of these various ethnic groups continues today. The Cantons of German-majority being offset by the seven predominately Catholic-German Cantons.
Ticino, the only Italian-speaking Canton, is overwhelmingly Catholic, while the Romansch-areas are divided into more-or-less equal religious sections. These "cross-cutting cleavages" have a very real effect of creating "cross-cutting pressures" among the Swiss population, which leaves no one linguistic or religious group with a strong-enough majority to singularly impose its will on the political process.
23 And yet it would be naïve to accept, in toto, the cross-cutting thesis of Swiss stability. Historically, these divisions have not always existed as they do today, and certain historical periods, most notably during the years immediately before the onset of the First World
War, have had their moments of language-based divisions. Andreas Wimmer explains that between 1914-1919, "for the first…time in Swiss history, political alliances became realigned on the basis of language," evident in the creation of the so-called (and short-lived) "Linguistic
Trench" that pitted pro-Axis German-Swiss against neutral-oriented French-Swiss.
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Furthermore, the cross-cutting thesis, when applied to other case studies -most notably Canada and Belgium -fails to produce similar causal results, with linguistic divisions in these states having the opposite force of actually crystallising divisional public and political opinion based on language. 25 In any event, for the purpose of this paper, it is simply enough to note that the many social divisions in Switzerland are both misleadingly compartmentalized (because of the existence of dozens of various German, Italian, and Romansch dialects) and difficult to understand because of the cross-cutting nature of religious practice. 
Establishing a Multi-Ethnic Nation: How the Swiss did it
We turn now to a more theoretical evaluation and explanation for the existence of a stable multi-ethnic Swiss national identity. While theorists of nationalism have developed several theoretical rationales for Swiss stability (the abovementioned 'cross-cutting cleavages' thesis is but one such example), I have identified three other circumstances, or factors, that have helped in the formation of a stable Swiss identity; (1) the presence of an overbearing external military threat, (2) elite accommodation and guidance, and (3) an innate will among the various groups to cooperate, cohabitate, and participate in nation-building. Each will be explored below in detail.
External Threats: Rallying Around the Flag of Swiss Ideals
Switzerland's history began, it was mentioned, as a response to the threat of war and 
Elite Accommodation: Giving Nation-Building a Helping Hand
Quite apart from the 'external threat' thesis explored above, the establishment, or perhaps creation, of a Swiss nation was also due to a concerted effort by various Swiss elites to form and support a common national identity. Elite accommodation, or consociation -understood as the formation of a specific political arrangement in which various ethnically divided groups share political power according to a mutually agreed-upon formula or institutional mechanism -was also an important precursor, and perhaps altogether necessary tool, for the formation of the Swiss nation. The consociational model of nation-building emphasises the vital importance of the capacity and good will of leading elites to help solidify and nurture a common identity within an ethnically divided nation. Carol Schimd writes, citing Arend Lijphart's work on the consociation model of nationalism, that "overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system," is required because only "deliberate joint effort by the elites can stabilize the sharp cleavages" of a multi-ethnic society. 32 As our historical analysis suggests, the rise of 'Swiss-ness' developed with the emergence among leading enlightened intellectuals in the eighteenth century of a commonly-perceived Swiss identity and an accepted will to cooperate, socially and politically, for its evolution. And hence, beginning in the mid-1700s, various Swiss scholars, elites, and philosophers sought to cooperate on a common national adventure.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a native of Geneva, wrote colourfully in 1763, that the thirteen Cantons of Switzerland acted as "une grande ville, divisée en treize quartiers" (a great city, divided into thirteen quarters) in which all the inhabitants suffered from "le hemvé" or homesickness. 33 The establishment, by German-speaking elites, of the Helvetic Society in 1797 (in association with the University of Basle) was a direct attempt by the organization's leaders to help re-awaken among the Swiss, a common awareness of their communal belonging. Many of the Society's members would later become leading political figures in the newly-formed National Legislature of the Hevetic Republic, formed, you will recall, with Napoleon's help in 1803. By mid-century, hundreds of these associations existed throughout Switzerland, nearly all of them cross-regional and multi-ethnic in scope and membership. In these newly established, multi-ethnic associations -such as The Swiss Association of Artists (1807) (1824) -an important precursor and training ground for militia-men -boasting nearly 2,000 members (of a total Swiss population of 2 million) only seven years later.
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All of these associations operated on a trans-cantonal basis, holding annual meetings in different parts of the country every year, and thus increased interregional travel. 36 As a result, association to these elite groups allowed members to encounter the ethnic diversity of the Swiss nation while being introduced to the political commonalities and shared aspirations each ethnic elite held in common. The result was greater acceptance of ethnic and linguistic divisions, which helped suppress ethnic association while catalyzing and strengthening a common Swiss identity based on political commonalities rather than primordial differences. Over time, a thick network of civil society was created, which allowed for a trans-ethnic and inclusive forms of nationbuilding to take place, guided in certain respects, by ethnic elites who shared a common view of the future and a common interest in the successful development of the Swiss nation. of a national will is a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, condition for the presence of a stable and functioning national identity.
The subject of a national will is quite abstract and unquantifiable, for how is one to find and explain such a feeling? And yet in the Swiss case, the invisible will of the Swiss nation is expressed on a daily basis. It is present in the fine balance the Swiss accept and practice, between their loyalties to a distinctive cantonal language and their allegiances to the inclusive attitudes of the collective federation. 41 It is present, writes Kohn, in the "spirit of tolerance, restraint and good will towards minorities" that perforates Swiss society. 42 And, it is present in the expectation and accepted belief, shared by every minority group, that the Swiss Constitution will continue to protect their interests and assist them in defending the integrity of their distinctiveness.
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In practice, the Swiss will is present in certain cultural traditions. It is significant, for
instance, that when a French and German-Swiss speak together, regardless of whether they meet in a French or German Canton, the language to be used in conversation is most apt to be French.
Likewise, when addressing a multilingual group, a Swiss-German will use High German, rather than his Low German dialect. These customs, explains Schmid, are practiced "as a convenience and courtesy to a minority language group." 44 How very different from our customs in Canada, where a French-Canadian might be rather surprised to be addressed in French on the streets of Vancouver! Constitutionally, Swiss toleration is legally enshrined. Minority groups are overrepresented in the judiciary, the public service, and in federal organizations, and are generally granted a position of privilege, represented in government beyond their numerical 41 Schmid, op. cit., 31. proportions. 45 Administratively, linguistic territories are also recognized, so that a ticket collector, walking down the aisles of a train, will call for tickets in German until the 'invisible frontier' is crossed, at which time he will continue collecting them in French. 46 Similarly, toleration and negotiation are taught in the education system. In the national teacher's handbook, a section is devoted to teaching Lebenskunde, translated as 'Information for Life', in which the importance of conflict mediation and resolution are stressed. In class, theories of mediation are taught and then applied to explain the outcome of various historical linguistic and cultural disputes that have developed in Switzerland. 47 It would seem, then, that the Swiss nation, and the state that houses it, remains stable because of an historically based acceptance of the multi-ethnic national union and a continued belief in its need and value.
Learning from the Swiss: Applying the Lessons of Switzerland's Nation-Building Project
Our discussion so far has presented the Swiss nation as a rather unusual and curious political animal. In a world of seemingly chronic genocidal hatred and conflict -most, if not all, of it based on ethno-cultural and religious divisions -the Swiss example represents a case to be emulated. If you have followed my discussion to this point, you may have for yourself, begun to understand why the Swiss example, however unique, represents an important lesson in social and political cohabitation. Switzerland is a living expression of a set of ideas, steeped in toleration and acceptance that overshadow primordial divisions. It is an ideal. Steinberg paraphrases the lessons marking Switzerland's political experiment as such: "Although the will of the majority makes law and constitutes the only true sovereign authority, the minorities, however small, have inalienable rights. The dilemma of majority will and minority rights can be overcome by the ingenuity of men."
48 And yet our brilliant 'ingenuity' for solving our differences is rarely used.
I ask you then, to explain to me the differences that exist between Switzerland and Iraq; that it develops. In areas of ethnic strife, the consociation of elites would be a necessary step towards stable nation-building.
(3) A multi-ethnic nation can be constructed and thrive if the divergent groups that identify with it, will it to survive. Even a homogenous group will fail as a nation if members of the collection stop willing its continued existence. I am quite unsure as to how a national will develops, but perhaps familial education, a tolerant culture, and an innate respect (and even love) of liberty and self-respect have something to do with its creation. In any event, a national will that respects and even promotes the continued uniqueness of divergent groups, will likely lead to the creation of a stable multi-ethnic nation. It is likely, then, that once the cognitive setting of the group turns towards toleration and cherishing non-primordial bonds, nations and states will rise.
But then again, perhaps I am simply a little naïve and modestly idealistic…
